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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 










DELAWARE STATE POLICE HEADQUARTERS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-18-cv-01379) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 30, 2019 
Before:  MCKEE, SHWARTZ and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
  
 







                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Matthew Jones, a self-represented litigant, appeals from the District 
Court’s order dismissing his complaint.  We will summarily affirm the dismissal for the 
reasons set forth by the District Court. 
In his complaint, which he was granted leave to prosecute in forma pauperis, Jones 
asserted federal question jurisdiction and the existence of a federal defendant (though 
there was no federal defendant named).  Jones sought ten billion dollars in damages for 
injuries he allegedly suffered at the hands of the Delaware State Police – from birth to 
present – as a result of repeated rapes, the forcible injection of antipsychotic drugs, and 
involuntary hospitalization.  He also sought the recusal of the assigned District Judge. 
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on February 12, 2019, the District 
Court denied Jones’ recusal motion and, after screening the complaint pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), determined that defendant Delaware State Police was immune 
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the 
complaint as “mostly frivolous and, to the extent not clearly frivolous, based upon 
Defendant’s immunity from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).”  See 
Mem. Op. at 7.  The District Court stated that the dismissal was without prejudice to 
Jones’ amending the complaint within 21 days.   Jones, rather than amending, filed a 
notice of appeal to this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and conclude that the District Court 
did not err in dismissing Jones’ complaint.1  The Supreme Court has long recognized that 
                                              
1  “Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor 
appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the 
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the Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies from suit in federal court 
regardless of the type of relief sought.  See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. 
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).  As the District Court correctly noted, “[a]bsent a 
state’s consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars a civil rights suit in federal court that 
names the state as a defendant . . . .”  Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 
1981) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)).  Delaware has not waived its 
immunity from suit in federal court and Congress has not abrogated its sovereign 
immunity.  See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).  The District Court thus 
appropriately dismissed the complaint. 
 We next consider whether the District Judge should have recused himself pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 455.  Jones requested that the District Judge recuse because he refused to 
order the United States Marshal to make service of the summons and complaint.  Jones 
further asserted that the District Judge “took no action on his behalf” despite being 
provided with evidence that he “remain[s] kidnapped, raped and poisoned under a false 
                                              
cause of action.”  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam).  The order will be final and appealable, however, if the plaintiff “declares his 
intention to stand on his complaint.”  Id. at 951–52.  Although there is no “clear rule for 
determining when a party has elected to stand on his or her complaint,” Hagan v. Rogers, 
570 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2009), this Court has exercised jurisdiction when the plaintiff 
failed to amend within the time provided by the District Court.  See Batoff v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that, because plaintiff did not 
move to amend within the time allotted by the district court, plaintiff “elected to stand on 
his complaint”).  Here, Jones did not file an amended complaint within the three-week 
period provided by the District Court.  Instead, Jones filed his notice of appeal.  Thus, 
pursuant to Batoff, the District Court’s February 12th order “became final after [21] 
days,” and “by failing to move to amend within the [21] days granted by the court, [he] 
elected to stand on his complaint.”  Id.  The District Court has made the same 
determination and recently entered an order directing that the action be closed. 
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identity.”  See Recusal Mot. at 1.  Jones’ arguments indicate a mere dissatisfaction with 
the District Court’s rulings against him, which is not a proper basis for recusal.  See 
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We 
have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an 
adequate basis for recusal . . . .”).  We thus conclude that Jones has not set out any basis 
for recusal in his references to the District Court’s actions. 
Accordingly, because this appeal presents no substantial issue, we will summarily affirm  
 
the District Court’s order of dismissal.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
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